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A shift from functionalism to constitutionalism is not a matter of changing the guards from 
one day to the other. These are incremental processes, over time. It is primarily a matter of 
attitudes and perceptions of existing instruments and their proper role and function. First of all, 
it influences the application and interpretation of existing instruments. It may lead, as exper-
ienced in the EEC, to recognition of implied exceptions. Second, it eventually influences the 
shape of agreements and instruments. It is submitted that the evolution has already begun in 
case law and could be traced in a number of adopted or unadopted panel reports still under the 
GATT of 1947, and in more recent panel reports and Appellate Body reports under the WTO 
since 1995. In the light of such historical experience, it is likely that positive standards will 
emerge in many other fields, including labour and the environment, exerting limiting effects 
on the free flow of goods and services. 
Constitutionalism, finally, also addresses the legitimacy of policy goals and how they are 
being defined. Rule-making and standard setting needs to be able to bring about a high level 
of acceptance. It requires substantial involvement of producer, consumer and public good 
interests, all at the same time. It needs to strike a proper balance between the different branches 
of government in this process. As rules and standard-setting on the international level expand, 
we seriously need to think about how international organizations can be brought closer to 
elected representation. 
In conclusion, these are all issues which go much beyond the WTO. The question of 
environmental or labor standards and the limits to trade, addressed by this panel, are the 
symptoms of a wider issue of governance. The problems addressed affect a great number of 
institutions, domestically, and on the international level. These are constitutional questions of 
governance of the global system at large. The WTO, and perhaps the Bretton Woods 
institutions, due to their political and economic effectiveness, are at the forefront of attention. 
The framework to address these issues, however, has to be a broader one. It fits to the title and 
theme of this conference: International Law in F ennent. In short, it is a matter of interfacing 
trade, environment, and human rights, of bringing about mutual support, and in case of conflict 
balance the interests based upon a coherent constitutional and intellectual framework. 
Ultimately, we are faced with the question whether international law as we knew it, from 
coexistence to cooperation, is up to the task of global integration, or whether constitutionalism 
will eventually lead to what we may call global law. 
REMARKS BY JOHN H. JACKSON 
The limits of international trade must be understood within the context of the institutional 
framework of the WTO, in particular, the decision-making and dispute settlement processes. 
The WTO dispute settlement rules are contained in the Dispute Settlement Understanding 
(DSU), which is Annex 2 to the WTO agreement. The DSU includes some comments on the 
philosophy, the direction and the purposes of the dispute settlement procedures. Article 3.2 of 
the DSU has some very interesting phrases. One of those phrases (roughly paraphrased) says, 
''None of the reports of the dispute settlement procedure should result in a change, addition, 
or subtraction from the rights and obligations of the members." Some have pointed to that 
clause as a warning against judicial activism. The panelists and Appellate Body members 
should not be changing the direction of the system in terms of its basic goals. Any changes to 
the direction of the system are to be left in the hands of the sovereign states, the nation states, 
and the members. I interpret Article 3.2 to mean: "Be careful." 
These first five years of the WTO may have been the most interesting five years of 
international jurisprudence in the history of mankind. This jurisprudence has been quite 
remarkable because it has had to struggle intimately with the details of the tension between 
nation-state sovereignty ideas and the need for multilateral solutions in a cooperative mech-
anism, particularly in the economic area, but arguably in all areas. In the economic area, it is 
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something that addresses the sowcalled "prisoner's dilemma." In other words, if governments 
"go it alone" they actually create problems for everyone, including themselves. The WTO is 
part of tht' nt'w attention by economists, including several Nobel Prize winners. to the insti-
tutions that underpin the market and the reality that the markets will not work without 
appropriate human institutions. l 
The WTO reflects an imbalance of human institutions. with its remarkably sophisticated 
dl!<>pute !<>ettlement process (i.e., the judicial branch) and its remarkably constrained decision-
making process (which you could call the legislative branch). The constraints on the decision-
making branch came about in the last three to four months of 1993. in the negotiations of the 
Uruguay Round. when the negotiators went to work more seriously on what we can roughly call 
the "WTO Charter:'1 That charter was much broader. more embracing. and more threatening 
to national sovereignty than the negotiators wanted. Therefore, the negotiators began to change 
that charter by rolling back the decision-making processes. Specifically, they began to constrain 
tho~e processes with super-majority requirements and stricter requirements of consensus deci-
.. ion making. Consensus is not unanimity. but something approaching it, in that it can lead to 
any country having the right to block measures, thereby resulting in stalemate. Indeed, that is 
part of what we saw in the Seattle fiasco, in the selection of the director-general, and in 
numerou" decisions made during the course of the first years of the WTO. 
Turning more specifically to environment and labor questions. we can see a rich history 
ofjuri$prudence relating to the environment. This jurisprudence has been the most interesting. 
fundamental. and thoughtful about the relationship of environment to other nonos, particularly 
trade treaty norms, that we have ever seen. One reason for this jurisprudence is the existence 
of the Appellate Body system. We have been tremendously lucky to have seven people with 
a diven,it)' of backgrounds and knowledge appointed to the Appellate Body roster. They have 
interacted well \\1th one another. and a system of collegiality has developed, which is extremely 
important in the Appellate Body system and hopefully can be continued with the new members. 
We have had three important cases, namely. the Gasoline case against the United States 
by Venezuela and Brazil/ the Beef Hormones case,4 and the Shrimp!Turtle case.s The Shrimp/ 
Turtlt: I,.'u.;;e raises some very fundamental issues, and the decision took the so-called 
"evolutionary approach" to interpreting treaty language. Yet, throughout the early jurispru-
dence of the WTO and the Appellate Body opinions, there have been constant statements of 
deference to nation-state sovereignty. Such deference statements are in cases such as the 
G(/$uline case and the Japanese Alcoholic Beverages case,6 where the Appellate Body in fact 
held against the nation~state. Nevertheless. the Appellate Body held that the nation~state should 
have u very \\1de scope to regulate, but there are boundaries. These Appellate Body reports tell 
U~ what these boundaries are, which mayor may not be the line that you would logically draw. 
But in the Beef HOnllOlleS case, the Appellate Body rolled back the first-level panel. saying that 
the panel had over$tepped a bit. The Appellate Body was prepared to step back and give a 
wider scope to the nation-state. 
In the Shrimp!Tllrtle case. though, there was an additional interesting layer added to some 
of these l'>~ues. Part of the jurisprudence carried forward from the GATT. going back to a case 
, Sec RONALD H. COASE. THE F~I, THE :tvJA.t:ulJrr. AND THE LAw (19SS): Douglass C. North, mstitutions, 
In'titutJOnal Chomge. Md Economic Performance (1990). 
: Agr<:!ement E$t.lbh~hing the World Trade Organization. reprinted in 33 n..M 13, 15 (1994). 
, WTO Appellate Body Report. United States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, 
WT/DS21Jt. ..JfA.BlR • .ldopted May 20. 1996. 
, WTO Appell.lte Body Report, BC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), WrlDS26 & 
..m/ABIR • .n.lopted Feb. B. 1998. 
, WTO Appellate Body Report. United States -Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, 
\\TfDS5stA.BfR. adopted No\', 6, 1998. 
"WTO Appellate Body Report. Japan- Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WTIDSS, 10 & I11ABIR, adopted Nov. 
I 1996. 
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called the Belgian Family Allowances/ has been to look at the word "product" in Article III 
of GATT (the national treatment of like products). This suggests that the dispute settlement 
system and the treaty structure are focused on the characteristics of the products and not on the 
characteristics of how they were made, the home country that produced them, or the production 
process itself. The product-process distinction has been a fairly bright-line bulwark against 
sliding down a slippery slope of blocking products at the border for activities related to 
production, such as Sunday closing laws, hours for labor, or environmental measures. This 
distinction has been heavily criticized by some of the proponents of both labor and environ-
ment. In fact, the product-process distinction will probably not survive and perhaps should not 
survive. The key challenge is to know how far down the slope we are willing to slide, in other 
words, to find the handholds on the slope. The question then becomes: is an Appellate Body 
function or a negotiating function needed to address this problem? 
In the ShrimpfI'urtle case, the Appellate Body ignored that question, while at the same time 
suggesting that it could uphold border measures that were really targeted at process (i.e., a ban 
on shrimp caught with nets that kill sea turtles). This issue remains open, and it will be very 
interesting to see where it leads. Thus far, efforts to have a decision-making process or a 
negotiating process solve some of the environmental clashes with trade have failed, partly due 
to the institutional infirmities alluded to at the beginning of these remarks. Therefore, there is 
a very strong impetus to push those issues in the direction of a resolution, and the dispute 
settlement process is a logical target. 
7 Belgium-Family Allowances (Allocations FamiIiaIes), Nov. 6, 1952, GAITB.I.S.D. (lstSupp.) at 59 (1953). 
